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REPORT OF WORKING GROUP #5
Kara H. Ching
The Working Group on Deciding Whether to Represent a Client
discussed, as the title suggests, whether and to what extent a lawyer's
religious beliefs should influence her decision to accept a client. The
working group had the benefit of the attached outline of questions,
which had been prepared before the working group met. The group
explored many of the questions raised in the outline as well as other
questions raised by the participants.
There was no dispute among the group members that a lawyer's
religious perspective was an appropriate factor to consider when de-
ciding whether to represent a client. As the group continued its dia-
logue, however, it became apparent that there were several issues
over which participants disagreed.
The group discussed several issues involved in representing corpo-
rate clients. Some provocative questions were raised in connection
with the situation where a lawyer is not alone in deciding whether to
accept a corporate client. Specifically, the scenario where a junior as-
sociate in a law firm is assigned to defend an ill-intentioned corporate
defendant sparked some debate among participants. One member ad-
vanced the view that there are certain cases in which a religious per-
son simply should not be involved, regardless of the consequences.
This participant went on to stress that a lawyer does not always suffer
negative consequences when she makes the right choice, but rather
that in some instances the decision is rewarded. Another member
suggested that not all lawyers, for example, those with families, may
view the possibility of losing their jobs or being removed from the
partnership track as an acceptable risk. A participant mentioned that
one option for a lawyer who is representing a client she would not
have chosen on her own, is to make the most of the representation-
to work from within to enlighten and influence the corporate client.
One group member expressed her belief that, although Christian
lawyers should avoid evil, in many instances it may be appropriate for
a lawyer to represent a guilty individual criminal defendant but not a
corporate defendant with an evil motive in a civil action. This distinc-
tion serves two purposes. First, by representing a criminal defendant,
the lawyer plays a role in limiting state power and coercion. Second,
by declining to represent a corporate defendant, the lawyer avoids a
situation where she may be more likely to participate in the evil. The
group acknowledged, however, that not all corporate representation
should be avoided. For example, one participant suggested that where
a lawyer could only accept one case, choosing to represent a corporate
client with a good motive, over a needy pro bono client, could be rec-
onciled by using the corporate fees to assist the indigent client.
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The group also identified several issues present in the criminal con-
text. One example is when a junior prosecutor is pressured to prose-
cute a defendant who the lawyer believes is innocent. Another
scenario is where the lawyer becomes aware that her criminal defend-
ant client has committed crimes other than the one charged. This situ-
ation illustrates the tension between the attorney-client privilege and
both a lawyer's religious beliefs and her duties as an officer of the
court.
These scenarios evoked the question of whether there is a point at
which a religious attorney must decide that she cannot practice law.
The group responded by suggesting methods to avoid situations that
place a lawyer's religious beliefs in conflict with professional obliga-
tions. One suggestion was disclosing the lawyer's religious perspective
to prospective clients before agreeing to accept the case. This ap-
proach would put the client on notice that the lawyer's beliefs may
play a role in her representation. Another possibility raised was in-
cluding in the engagement letter an option for the attorney to with-
draw from the case should the client lie to the lawyer. Both of these
options suggest that not only does a lawyer have a choice of whom to
represent, but also that the prospective client may choose to engage
another attorney. By disclosing a religious perspective before ac-
cepting representation, a lawyer may be able to avoid some difficult
future situations. Not surprisingly, there were questions that accom-
panied these suggestions. For example, was it always necessary for a
lawyer to disclose her religious beliefs? When disclosure is appropri-
ate, to what extent should she explain her beliefs? The group raised,
but did not consider, whether it would ever be appropriate for the
lawyer to inquire into the beliefs of the prospective client.
As mentioned above, all participants agreed that a lawyer's reli-
gious beliefs could properly be considered in deciding whether to rep-
resent a client. To explore the boundaries of that premise, a
participant raised the question of whether a religiously motivated at-
torney who had decided not to accept representation of a client could
convince other attorneys not to represent the client. Some group
members expressed that the answer may be influenced by whether the
other lawyers were in the same religious community. This distinction
led to a follow-up question: If lawyers may convince other attorneys
not to take a case for religious reasons, would a lawyer be permitted
to convince every attorney in an area-for example, in a small town or
city-such that the potential client could not retain a lawyer and, as a
result, be effectively denied access to the courts?
The Working Group shaped the agenda to address the problems
that were raised in the Group's sessions. Participants placed great
emphasis on education and communication, both in the law schools
and among practicing attorneys. Members of the group disagreed,
however, over whether to include in the agenda the word moral in the
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term "a lawyer's spiritual and moral understandings." This dispute
identifies an undercurrent that ran throughout the group's meetings.
Many participants wanted their concerns about religion to be ad-
dressed specifically and directly. Some of these participants did not
want the inclusion of the more general concept of morality to dilute
attention and respect given to spiritual issues. Others in the group
advocated for the inclusion of a lawyer's morality as a more inclusive
term capable of encompassing more ethical challenges faced by
lawyers.
The sessions of the Working Group were characterized by lively dis-
cussion. Although participants did not always agree, the group was
enthusiastic about exchanging ideas and developing the agenda.
CLIENT SELECTION: OUTLINE OF QUESTIONS
GROUP #5
I. Relevance of Religion, Generally
A. Extent of lawyer autonomy in choosing clients and matters.
To what extent are decisions about which clients to repre-
sent and which matters to represent them in (i.e., the scope of
the representation) a matter of personal autonomy or discre-
tion, so that the lawyer would be justified/obligated to make
this decision in whole or in part on the basis of religious
convictions?
1. Must a lawyer accept every client who walks in the door
(whom the lawyer is qualified to represent)? If not, is
the answer different if one is the proverbial "last lawyer
in town?" How are these questions addressed by (a) the
legal profession's norms; (b) particular religious norms;
and (c) other societal norms?
2. Assuming that the lawyer generally has autonomy in
choosing clients and matters, to what extent is it appro-
priate to make this choice on the basis of religious con-
victions (as distinguished from moral, financial or other
considerations)? Lawyers are often characterized as "of-
ficers of the court;" de Toqueville referred to lawyers as
members of the "governing class." If one gives full force
to these metaphors, then might arguments for strict sep-
aration of church and state, traditionally offered in the
context of government officials, be extended to lawyers?
Should religion should be kept out of lawyers' decision-
making, as Professor Hoffman suggests, in order to pro-




3. On a personal level (e.g., as a matter of the lawyer's spir-
itual, psychological, moral development), what is the ef-
fect of making or not making choices on the basis of
one's religious convictions?
4. How are similar questions answered by other profession-
als-e.g., medical professionals and members of the
clergy-and to what extent is the situation for lawyers
similar or different? For example, what is the relevance
of religion in decisions by doctors or members of the
clergy concerning whom to serve, and do the answers
have any relevance to lawyers?
B. Influence of practice settings.
To what extent is the lawyer's autonomy limited by the set-
ting in which the lawyer practices? Assuming that a solo
practitioner has complete autonomy in deciding whom to
represent, is the same true of a lawyer serving in a law firm,
as in-house counsel, or as a prosecutor? (For example, may/
must an associate in a law firm refuse to work on a particular
case that is in conflict with his or her religious convictions or
do the lawyer's fiduciary duties to the law firm require the
lawyer to undertake this work? May a prosecutor refuse to
bring a death penalty case or refuse to prosecute the victim
of spousal abuse out of religious conviction? For a prosecu-
tor who exercises discretion on behalf of the sovereign, may
religious convictions enter into decisions about whom to in-
vestigate and what charges to bring and, if not, how is this
avoidable?)
C. Court appointments.
To what extent is the lawyer's autonomy subject to the
court's authority to appoint the lawyer to represent a partic-
ular litigant? Le., assuming that on religious grounds the
lawyer would have turned down a particular client if he had
walked in the door, may/must the lawyer nevertheless repre-
sent that client if the court asks/orders the lawyer to do so?
D. Withdrawal from the representation.
Accepting that religious convictions properly may influ-
ence or determine a lawyer's choices about what clients and
matters to accept, is the same true about the decision
whether to continue in the representation? When a lawyer
experiences a conflict between the representation and his or
her religious convictions that had not been anticipated at the
outset, may/must the lawyer seek to withdraw from the rep-
resentation? Should the law permit the lawyer to do so?
E. Lawyer competence: the relevance of the CLIENT'S religion
The legal profession's norms tell lawyers not to undertake
work for which they are not competent or capable of becom-
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ing competent. To what extent must a competent lawyer be-
come familiar with the religious and cultural norms, practices
and traditions of the client, in order competently to counsel
the client and to make or suggest appropriate decisions re-
garding the representation?
II. Relevance of Particular Religious Traditions to Particular
Choices About Clients and Matters
A. Particular Choices Made By Lawyers
What are the ways in which one's religious convictions
might influence choices about clients and matters?
1. Might it be appropriate to prefer certain types of clients
or legal matters? E.g., (a) serving the homeless, the
poor, the sick; (b) serving members of one's own reli-
gious faith.
2. Might it be appropriate/obligatory to refitse certain cli-
ents and matters for religious reasons. E.g., (a) evil indi-
viduals/entities (such as murderers or tobacco
companies); (b) individuals/entities seeking "evil" ends
(such as a party seeking to renege on a contract or, in
Teresa Collett's example, a donor seeking sexual services
in exchange for a gift or a farm owner seeking a clause in
a contract that would permit him to exclude others from
migrant workers' premises); (c) individuals/entities seek-
ing ends unworthy of one's talents and time (such as
landlords seeking evictions, corporations seeking to in-
crease their wealth, businesses seeking to avoid or delay
payment of a debt).
3. If one's position is that it is obligatory to refuse certain
clients or matters, does that mean that no lawyer should
take on the client or the matter? Or does that simply
mean that the particular lawyer should not do so, but
that another lawyer with a different set of beliefs may or
should do so?
4. Does the opportunity to provide moral counseling, and
thereby to influence the client's conduct, suggest that the
religious lawyer should represent evil/unworthy clients?
Since bad clients will almost inevitably find lawyers, isn't
it better that they have moral lawyers rather than indif-
ferent ones? Or is there too great a risk that the lawyer
will be unsuccessful in counseling the client and end up
aiding the client in an unworthy or evil purpose and do-
ing so half-heartedly? And, does undertaking the repre-
sentation with the aim of influencing the client's conduct
in this way unduly encroach on the client's autonomy?
B. Relevance of Religious Traditions and Beliefs
1998] 1617
1618 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
1. Relevance of Particular Religious Traditions and Beliefs
How would particular religious convictions guide the
decision of whether to undertake the representation in
particular situations (e.g., evil or unworthy clients and
matters; clients with the same or different religious pref-
erences; etc.)?
2. Relevance of Religion Generally
Should religiously observant lawyers, as Mr. Lewin
suggests, promote legal protection for religious
practices?
